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University of Venice
the republic of venice has rightly been considered a prime example of
the fusion between political institutions and trade. Frederic Lane aptly
defined the Venetian Senate, Venice’s most important political-institu-
tional body, as the Republic’s “board of governors”1. The great historian
meant to stress that the state institutions in certain aspects embodied the
interests of the ruling class, which for the most part consisted of merchants
– at least until the end of the fifteenth century – and also that these inter-
ests had shaped the Republic’s system of government. Here we have
distant echoes of a well-established image about Venice that was wide-
spread throughout Europe. As Lewes Roberts, director of the Levant
Company and the East India Company, stated in 1638, Venice, together
with the cities of Tuscany, Holland and the Hanseatic League, were exam-
ples of states where “merchandizing is found to be the school from whence
they gather their first principles, and indeed the chief foundation upon
which their fabric of political government is raised, the scale by which
their counsels are framed and the pillars by which the same is seen to be
supported and maintained”2. Economic and institutional mechanisms,
1. F. C. Lane, Andrea Barbarigo, Merchant of Venice, 1418-1449, ( Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, Baltimore, 1944), p. 48.
2. L. Roberts, The Merchant’s Map of Commerce, (London, 1638) (quoted by P. Gauci,
The Politics of Trade. The Overseas Merchant in State and Society, 1660-1720, (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2001), pp. 169-170. 
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relationships and opportunities did indeed greatly foster commerce, so
much so that Ugo Tucci wondered how a Venetian could fail to make a
fortune in such a favourable environment3. Formal and informal structures
were the underlying factors in Venetian success4. Unlike Genoa, in
medieval Venice the clan structure gradually became weaker, and, at the
same time, the ruling class managed to create a system of regulations that
prevented the formation of a dominant group and encouraged collabora-
tion between family groups and the various factions5. Since the most
important families did not present a unified and compact front due to
contrasting economic and political interests, it proved difficult the forma-
tion of a faction strong enough to achieve political supremacy6. It was
probable too that, at least until the seventeenth century, in terms of wealth
there were no barriers to exogamous relations among the various patrician
clans, whereas in the following century the tendency of intermarriage
between families that had similar status and economic means emerged7.
Family connections established through marriages between nobles and
the rest of the Venetians declined from the fifteenth century onwards,
when the patriciate became a true ruling caste8. 
The fact that the government paid particular attention to the power
relations between factions does not naturally imply that economic inter-
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3. U. Tucci, “Il patriziato veneziano, mercante e umanista” in Idem, Mercanti, navi, monete
nel Cinquecento veneziano, (Il Mulino, Bologna, 1981), p.19. 
4. For a wide-ranging analysis of the role of the institutions, A. Greif, Institutions and the
Path to the Modern Economy. Lessons from Medieval Trade, (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge 2006); see also G. Clark’s observations in Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, 45, 2007, pp. 725-741; and S. Ogilvie, Institutions and European Trade,
(Cambridge, CUP 2011).
5. A. Greif, Institutions, op. cit., p. 171.
6. S. Chojnacki, “In search of the Venetian patriciate: families and factions in the four-
teenth century” in J. R. Hale (ed.) Renaissance Venice, (Faber and Faber, London,
1973), pp. 69-70.
7. V. Hunecke, Il patriziato veneziano alla fine della Repubblica, 1646-1797. Demografia,
famiglia, ménage, ( Jouvence, Rome, 1997), pp. 190-196.
8. S. Chojnacki, “Kinship ties and young patricians” in Idem, Women and Men in Renaiss -
ance Venice, ( John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2000), pp. 224-226.
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ests did not influence the decisions of the Republic’s great political
bodies. The clash between “old” and “young”, which was a feature of
Venetian political life, at least throughout the sixteenth and the early
seventeenth centuries9, could be interpreted as a confrontation between
families that had access to income deriving from ecclesiastical high offices
and families that were debarred from them. When, in 1504, it was
discussed in the Senate whether to begin contracting out provisioning
for the convoy to the Flanders, there was a sharp dispute between those
with full warehouses – and who were therefore not at all in favour of
increasing the supply of goods – and those who needed to boost stock,
relying upon low prices10. Similarly, we should wonder whether the
substantial presence of “old”, and wealthy families in the Aleppo market
at the end of the fifteenth century might have driven the clans involved
to lobby the senators and the various magistrates in Venice11. It is true,
however, that the close ties between patrician families, as well as those
between noble merchants and citizens, prevented the formation of
substantial power groups capable of controlling the Republic’s economic
policy for a lengthy period. Norms and family connections, on the one
hand, explain the solidity of the Venetian institutions, but, on the other
hand, a ruling class based on kinship had some drawbacks. In 1492, for
example, Santo Trion refused to pay the fine that the Venetian Consul in
London, Lorenzo Pisani, had levied on him after a dispute between two
galley-owners, and he appealed to the English Court of Chancery,
claiming that the Consul was a relative of Vettor Pisani, who would have
lost a lot of money if the verdict were in favour of Tron12. 
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9. G. Cozzi, Il doge Nicolò Contarini. Ricerche sul patriziato veneziano agli inizi del Seicento,
Istituto per la collaborazione culturale, Venezia/Roma, 1958.
10. U. Tucci, “Costi e ricavi di una galera veneziana ai primi del Cinquecento” in Idem,
Mercanti, navi, monete op. cit., p. 168.
11. On trading families involved in trade with Aleppo, cf. E. Vallet, Marchands vénitiens en
Syrie à la fin du XVe siècle. Pour l’honneur et le profit, (ADHE, Paris, 1999), pp. 112-120.
12. The episode is quoted in A. A. Ruddock, Italian Merchants and Shipping in Southampton
1270-1600, (University College, Southampton, 1951), p. 137.
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Mercantile State Institutions: the Galley System
despite the fact that most maritime trade was conducted in round
sailing ships (navi tonde a vela), research on Venetian international trade
has focused on the so-called merchant galleys (galere di mercato), i.e. state
vessels that transported the most precious goods in the international
import and export trade between East and West. These vessels, built in
the Republic’s dockyards, were hired out by the government through
public auction. The bidders undertook to fit out the galleys for the voyage
and to levy freight charges that were pre-established by the government,
which also appointed the captain of the muda (convoy). These convoys
transported men and goods according to a principle of collective respon-
sibility and sharing cost. The great season of government convoys began
in the early fourteenth century and finished towards the end of the
fifteenth century, when only a few lines were still running. The service
ended in 156913. It is important to point out that only patricians had the
right to hire galleys. This led to a distinct separation between the nobility
and the rest of the population; however, it is likely that other social classes
invested money and goods alongside the patricians took part in the state
convoy system too14.
What were the implications of the government convoy system for Vene-
tian trade? First of all, it must be stressed that the state provided overseas
trade with vessels that could not easily be provided by private citizens.
Building and fitting out great galleys required substantial investment,
bearing in mind that the average life of a galley in full working order was
not more than about ten years15. This means that four or five galleys had to
be built every two years. To this we should add the huge sums in coins,
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13. For the merchant galley system cf. D. Stöckly, Le système de l’Incanto des galées du
marché à Venise (fin XIIIe-milieu XVe siècle), (Brill, Leiden, 1995); C. Judde de Lariv-
ière, Naviguer, commercer, gouverner. Economie maritime et pouvoirs à Venise (XVe-XVIe
siècles), (Brill, Leiden, 2008).
14. B. Doumerc, D. Stöckly, “L’évolution du capitalisme marchand à Venise: le finance-
ment des galere da mercato à la fin du XVe siècle” in Annales ESC, 1995, p. 137.
15. F. C. Lane, Navires et constructeurs à Venise pendant la Renaissance, (Sevpen, Paris,
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precious metals and goods that were transported. For example, during the
period between 1449 and 1468, the value of trade with Syria alone
exceeded 400,000 ducats per year16. Therefore fitting out a convoy would
have required private citizens’ mobilizing enormous sums of money, which
in certain years might amount to the government’s entire tax revenue.
The convoy system allowed merchants to enjoy advantages in compar-
ison with their competitors. At least until the fifteenth century, marketing
costs were generally lower, because insurance charges were small
compared to goods transported on round ships. The high protection
costs (arms, crews, the need for frequent victualling) were however
reduced due to the economies of scale allowed by the mude. Once they
arrived at the market destination, the merchants had precedence over
other Venetians in trade negotiations. Since many products were bought
by muda merchants, they fixed the prices from a strong position17. The
government convoys’ calendar regulated Venetian market trends and
provided important information for forecasters regarding the “tightness”
or “abundance” of currency and the availability of foreign goods18. 
From the government’s point of view, maintaining an expensive
system based on great galleys was justified first and foremost by military
requirements. At least until the Battle of Lepanto, the galley had domi-
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1965), p.129; L. Gatti, L’Arsenale e le galee. Pratiche di costruzione e linguaggio tecnico a
Genova tra medioevo ed età moderna, (Quaderni del CNR, Genova, 1990), pp. 98-101.
16. F. J. Apellaniz, “Crise financière et rapports internationaux: la faillite des corporations
européennes dans le sultanat mamelouk (1450-1517)” in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.),
Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico secc. 13.-18., Atti della Settimana di
studi, vol.38, (Le Monnier, Firenze, 2007), pp.621-622.
17. This aspect is stressed by Stöckly, Le système de l’Incanto op. cit., p.207.
18. U. Tucci, “Alle origini dello spirito capitalistico a Venezia: la previsione economica”
in Studi in onore di Amintore Fanfani, III, (Giuffrè, Milano, 1962), pp. 545-557; F.
Lane, “Ritmo e rapidità di giro d’affari nel commercio veneziano del Quattrocento”
in Studi in onore di Gino Luzzatto, (Giuffrè, Milano) I, pp. 254-273; G. Luzzatto, “Vi
furono fiere a Venezia?” in Idem, Studi di storia economica veneziana, (Cedam, Padova,
1954), pp. 201; R. C. Mueller, The Venetian Money Market, ( Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, Baltimore, 1997).
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nated the Mediterranean and symbolized the Republic’s naval power.
Its speed and manoeuvrability rendered it unique, both for controlling
sea routes and for transporting goods, which were not very voluminous
but were of great value, such as spices and silks. The mude provided an
excellent training-ground both for oarsmen and for young patricians
taken on as crossbowmen. The merchant galleys and their human capital
could be easily transformed into an efficient war machine.
State Institutions and Merchants
we may ask whether the government convoy system enabled
merchants to avoid – or at least to limit – recourse to their own network.
There is no doubt that the support of Venetian overseas authorities and
the presence of convoys saved the merchant considerable transaction costs
(protection, information, law enforcement). Merchants had to deal with a
complex mechanism concerning not only the transportation and the sale
of products, but also the gathering and the processing of a substantial
amount of information. Hundreds of people were involved, in one way or
another, in the merchants’ network. In some twenty business letters
concerning Ambrogio Malipiero, who operated in Syria in the 1480s, 101
people are mentioned19 and in 1482 the forty-odd letters the Bembo
brothers sent from Venice were addressed to twenty different people from
London to Constantinople20. Andrea Berengo corresponded with seventy
people, living on the Adriatic and in Syria, in eleven months between
October 1555 and August 155621. These intense exchanges of letters and
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19. E. A. Congdon, Venetian Merchant Activity within Mamluk Syria (886-893/1481-
1487), “Al-Masāq”, 7, 1994, pp. 1-33. 
20. F. Thiriet, “Les lettres commerciales des Bembo et le commerce vénitien dans l’empire
ottoman à la fin du XVe siècle” in Studi in onore di Armando Sapori, II, (Istituto Edito-
riale Cisalpino, Milano, 1957), pp. 915-916.
21. U. Tucci (ed.), Lettres d’un marchand vénitien. Andrea Berengo (1555-1556), (Sevpen,
Paris 1957). Cf. also J. Tracy, “Syria’s Arab traders as seen by Andrea Berengo, 1555-
1556” in Oriens, 37, 2009, pp. 163-176.
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information probably contributed to building trust and a good reputation
among the various merchants, among the sedentary merchants and their
agents, and among the various agents and factors, who often did business
together in the same market. The Venetian advantage lay in its being an
important – perhaps the most important – political and commercial infor-
mation centre in Europe and in the Mediterranean22. 
It has been rightly stated that Venice is a distinctive case as far as the
role of government in trade is concerned. Avner Greif has shown that
informal institutions based on reputation were important in developing
solid relations within trading groups that were, for the most part, united
by the same religious or ethnic faith23. In Venice, however, we have a
case where government institutions generated strong incentives to
behave honestly. The system of protection for mercantile traffic, for
example, made it possible to lower – or rather to distribute more widely
– production costs, and the overseas consular system provided impor-
tant services for Venetian merchants. Dishonest conduct would thus
have prevented the merchant or his agent from continuing to benefit
from the system’s economic advantages24. Probably these aspects
contributed to creating a favourable environment for wide-spread
trust25; trust that was regarded as an unquestionable fact but which had
to be renewed in view of the economic and social changes that affected
both Venice and the international market. 
However, what seemed to function effectively until the fifteenth century
began to reveal its limitations in the sixteenth century. By then the Re-
public’s convoy system was proving too costly and, above all, was controlled
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22. P. Burke, “Early modern Venice as a center of information and communication” in J.
Martin, D. Romano (eds.), Venice Reconsidered. The History and Civilization of an
Italian City-state, 1297-1797, ( Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2000), pp.
389-419, with bibliographical references.
23. A. Greif, Institutions op. cit., pp. 58-90.
24. Y. Gonzáles de Lara, “The secret of Venetian success: a public-order, reputation-based
institution” in European Review of Economic History, 12, 2008, pp. 247-285.
25. W. Panciera, Fiducia e affari nella società veneziana del Settecento, (Cleup, Padova, 2001).
J_0212_Cecchini_pp.87-114  17/09/12  10.46  Pagina 95
by a narrow group of patricians, advocates of the “partito del mare” (sea
party)26. It was, in fact, the emergence of a faction closely connected with
commercial profits that, among other reasons, drove the ruling class to
gradually abandon the mude system. Technological developments due to
artillery and the improvement of the round ships, had by this time made
the galleys too expensive in terms of their actual advantages. The Venetians’
trading fortunes were also reduced by the consuls’ increasing incapacity
to adapt to the structural changes the international market was undergoing.
At Izmir, for example, they failed to understand that the balance of power
between the capital and the peripheral areas had changed, and that, there-
fore, negotiations should be carried out with the local authorities instead
of with the central authorities27. It was, indeed, in the traditional trading
area of the Levant that the role of support provided by the Venetian
consuls to Venetian merchants was gradually replaced by that of the
French, English, Dutch and Austrian consuls to their countrymen28; even
in 1669, at the end of the long war against the Ottomans, Venetian subjects
continued to sail around Constantinople, flying a foreign flag29. 
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26. B. Doumerc, “Le parti de la mer à Venise à la fin du XVe siècle : une étude prosopogra-
phie in L. Balletto (ed.), Oriente e Occidente tra Medioevo ed età moderna. Studi in onore
di G. Pistarino, (Brigati, Genova, 1997), pp. 177-190; B. Doumerc, D. Stöckly, “L’évo-
lution du capitalisme marchand à Venise: le financement des galere da mercato à la
fin du XVe siècle” Annales ESC, 1995, pp. 133-157 ; B. Doumerc, C. Judde de Larivière,
“Le rôle du patriciat dans la gestion des galères marchandes à Venise au début du seiz-
ième siècle” in Studi Veneziani, n.s., 36, 1998, p. 57-84.
27. D. Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650, (University of Washington
Press, Seattle, 1990), 105-6, 110-118.
28. A. L. Horniker, “Anglo-French rivalry in the Levant from 1583 to 1612”, Journal of
Modern History, 18, (1946), p. 289-305.
29. L. Güçer, “La situation du négociant vénitien devant le régime douanier de l’Empire
Ottoman” in Aspetti e cause della decadenza economica veneziana nel secolo XVII. Atti
del convegno 27 giugno – 2 luglio 1957, Venezia, Isola di San Giorgio Maggiore, Istituto
per la collaborazione culturale, (Venezia/Roma, 1961), pp. 279-285; R. Mantran, “La
navigation vénitienne et ses concurrentes en Méditerranée orientale aux XVIIe et
XVIIIe siècles” in M. Cortellazzo (ed.), Mediterraneo e Oceano indiano. Atti del Sesto
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Formal Contstraints
political equality among patricians was reflected in the opportuni-
ties of access to economic activities, in primis overseas trade. Theoreti-
cally, not all Venetians could become long-distance traders; in practice
while there were no juridical limitations for anyone willing to participate
in local trade, there were specific regulations to access  medium-and long-
range trading, the sector that ensured the city’s fortunes. Only patricians
and “citizens”, by birth or by charter (that is a class that was being defined
legally throughout the sixteenth century and was distinct from both the
nobility and the common people) enjoyed the legal right to be involved
in long-distance trading; and furthermore full citizenship granted
customs duty reductions on the goods traded.
In Venice there were two kinds of citizenship: de intus, which permitted
local trading, and de intus et de extra, which permitted international trading.
This latter status was granted on request after twenty-five years of resi-
dence and having paid all the taxes due. A good deal of research has been
published on various aspects (cultural, economic, political and social) of
the “citizen” families30. These studies have shown that the concept of citi-
Merchants and institutions in early-modern Venice
2012 | 2 97
Colloquio Internazionale di storia marittima, tenuto a Venezia dal 20 al 29 settembre
1962, (Olschki, Firenze, 1970), pp. 375-387: 378; J. Georgelin, Venise au siècle des
lumières, (Mouton, Paris/The Hague), 1978, pp. 70, 114-116.
30. R. C. Mueller, Immigrazione e cittadinanza nella Venezia medievale, Deputazione di
storia patria, (Rome, 2010); A. Bellavitis, Identità, mariage, mobilité sociale: citoyennnes
et citoyens à Venise au 16. siècle, (Ecole française de Rome, Roma, 2001); A. Zannini,
Burocrazia e burocrati a Venezia in età moderna: i cittadini originari (sec. 16.-18), (Istituto
veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, Venice, 1993); M. Casini, “La cittadinanza originaria
a Venezia tra i secoli XV e XVI: una linea interpretativa” in Studi veneti offerti a Gaetano
Cozzi, (Il Cardo, Venezia, 1992), pp. 133-150; R. C. Mueller, “Espressioni di status
sociale a Venezia dopo la “serrata” del Maggior Consiglio”, ibid., pp. 53-60; J. Grubb,
“Elite citizens” in J. Martin and D. Romano (eds.,) Venice Reconsidered op. cit., pp. 339-
364. Note that Alexandre Toussaint L. de Saint-Didier, La ville et la République de Venise
au XVIIe siècle, (Librairie Delagrave, Paris, 1891), p. 113, writing in the late seventeenth
century, considered the Venetian citizen class superior to the mainland aristocracy
“parce que ce corps (cittadino) a plus de rapport au gouvernement de la République
que n’en a la noblesse de la campagne et des villes de tout l’Etat”.
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zenship is somewhat flexible and subjected to demographic circum-
stances. Between 1305 and 1500 the government granted more than 3,600
citizenship titles. There was a notable increase in concessions during the
decades following the great plague of the mid-fourteenth century, rising
from an annual average of 180 to 380 in the period from 1350 to 1420,
whereas later the number fell to 9031. Between 1540 and 1632 there were
at least 253 requests for de intus et extra citizenship, and 48 for de intus citi-
zenship32. As far as economic implications are concerned, we might
wonder whether the regulations actually led to a distinct separation
between privileged and non-privileged citizens. The fact that thousands
of requests were received may suggest how the aspiration to obtain a legal
confirmation and citizenship status was an important issue. This filter,
however, does not seem to have been particularly effective as far as the
merchants were concerned: throughout the early modern age, we meet
successful merchants who did not belong to the de intus et de extra cate-
gory. In 1594, for example, Venetian subjects without the necessary requi-
sites were operating in Constantinople33. Is this another case of how legis-
lation does not reflect reality? Perhaps. What must be stressed, however,
is that in early-modern Venice the structural change in the social basis of
merchants – as we shall see – opened up the profession (if we can call it a
profession) to groups that did not come from traditional merchant circles. 
The Venetian trading system involved the wholesale trading of all
kinds of goods, without any particular specialization, and always seeking
the opportunity to make money34. It was “shrewd, skilled, subtle, clever
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31. L. Molà, R. Mueller, “Essere straniero a Venezia nel tardo Medioevo: accoglienza e
rifiuto nei privilegi di cittadinanza e nelle sentenze criminali” in S. Cavaciocchi (ed.),
Le migrazioni in Europa, secc. XIII-XVIII, Atti delle Settimane di Studio, vol. 25, (Le
Monnier, Firenze, 1994), pp. 839-851.
32. Cf. Appendix to A. Bellavitis, “ “Ars meccanica” e gerarchie sociali a Venezia tra XVI
e XVII secolo” in M. Arnoux, P. Monnet (eds.), Le technicien dans la cité en Europe
occidentale, 1250-1650, (Ecole française de Rome, Roma, 2004), pp. 161-179.
33. E. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople. Nation, Identity and Coexistence in the Early
Modern Mediterranean, ( Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006), pp. 41-42.
34. U. Tucci, Un mercante veneziano del Seicento: Simon Giogalli, Istituto Veneto di Scienze,
Lettere ed Arti, (Venezia, 2008), p. 22.
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and arduous work, which required a huge memory, intellect, and knowl-
edge of many and different things”35 and, generally speaking, people
entered the system at a very young age. The Venetian government
allowed less-wealthy young patricians to sail in the galere da mercato as
crossbowmen, with a small salary, and to embark their own commodi-
ties without paying freightage; this opportunity was considered “a sort
of socialized apprenticeship to trade and to the sea”36. The “typical”
merchant was therefore a patrician who held the strings of his own
trading contacts, thanks to members of his family or to close relations
located in the various business centres, in London or in Syria. He was
more like a mediator than a member of a big international company (as
was the case in the Florentine companies), and he acted more often in
collaboration rather than in competition with the big companies. A
widespread business organization in Venice was the decentralized family
partnership that did not have business as its sole aim, and based on coop-
eration among brothers (for the most part), but also on the work of
wage-earners and supplementary partners37.
Apparently that the system met with difficulties in the second half of
the sixteenth century. The mercantile world persisted to run its own
business traditionally, its main scope being “the transfer of goods from
a country where they cost less to another where they cost more, the
profit being the difference in price”38. The distinguishing feature of
Venetians trade, the active participation of patricians, was gradually
disappearing, while citizens were increasingly carrying out trade39. Many
patricians had already acted as sleeping partners in the fourteenth
century, lending money at interest and without being involved person-
Merchants and institutions in early-modern Venice
2012 | 2 99
35. T. Garzoni, La Piazza Universale di tutte le professioni del mondo (1584), (Pietro Maria
Bertano, Venezia 1638), c. 235v.
36. F. C. Lane, “Andrea Barbarigo, merchant of  Venice”, p. 17.
37. Ibid., pp. 85-100.
38. U. Tucci, “The psychology of the Venetian merchant in the sixteenth century”, in
J.R. Hale (ed.), Reinassance Venice, p. 356.
39. Ibid., pp. 74-88.
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ally40. The patriciate’s gradual withdrawal (as far as is known) has given
rise to much debate among historians41, but it is broadly acknowledged
that social mobility within the patriciate became more difficult, and
some of these groups gradually became poorer, since it was impossible
for them to obtain substantial reversals of fortune from trade, as they
had done in the past42. In 1594 the official community of Venetian
merchants at Costantinople was made up of seventeen persons, of whom
only one – Piero Bragadin – epitomized the traditional figure of the
patrician-merchant. He was one of the very few patrician-merchants left
still operating personally in the Levant (the second patrician present
was merely passing through Constantinople); none of the others were
nobles, and indeed one was Istrian and two were even Christian subjects
of the Sublime Porte43. The patriciate’s direct participation in foreign
trade by this time had thus become an exception rather than the rule,
and in Constantinople – the privileged trade hub of Venetian interme-
diation – there were only a few original citizens; most of the Venetian
merchant community was made up of immigrants, who joined together
to take advantage of the favourable tax conditions guaranteed by trade
with the East44. Similar mercantile communities seemed to be revital-
izing the home economy. The contribution of immigrants from the
mainland in the second half of the sixteenth century is considerable in
the economic sectors connected with the growing consumption of a
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40. G. Luzzatto, “La commenda nella vita economica dei secoli XIII e XIV con particolare
riguardo a Venezia” in Idem, Studi di storia economica op. cit., pp. 59-79; F. C. Lane,
Andrea Barbarigo op. cit., pp. 94-106. 
41. For general considerations see G. Gullino, “I patrizi veneziani e la mercatura negli
ultimi tre secoli della Repubblica” in G. Borelli (ed.), Mercanti e vita economica nella
Repubblica Veneta (secoli XIII-XVIII), (Banca popolare di Verona, Verona, 1985), pp.
403-451, and E. Dursteler, Venetians op. cit., pp.42 et seq.
42. G. Trebbi, “La società veneziana” in Storia di Venezia, vol. VI: Dal Rinascimento al
Barocco, G. Cozzi, P. Prodi (eds.), (Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana, Roma, 1994),
pp. 129-213: pp. 134-135.
43. E. Dursteler, Venetians op. cit., pp. 41-42.
44. Ibid., p. 49.
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large city. For example, the trading of the marzeri (haberdashers and
cloth sellers), which was carried on by differing levels of tradesmen
ranging from pedlars to luxury dealers, had no guild policy of controlling
membership registration, and experienced a real explosion with the
registration of more than three hundred new members between 1574
and 157645. Many of them had business “in Soria”46, although the wealth
of Bartolomeo Bontempelli, who sent someone to the “Indies”47, is quite
exceptional.
The Venetian market maintained its international role thanks to foreign
and immigrant merchants and to their ability, not only to take over the
role the patricians previously had in the Eastern and European markets
(at the end of the sixteenth century all operations in London had to be
carried out through the Florentine Bartolomeo Corsini48, and at that
time foreign ships were being used for an increasing amount of Venetian
maritime trade49), but also to set in train efficient collaboration strategies.
In less than two years, from the end of 1596 to August 1598, the “Heirs
of Giovanni Hofer” company bought pepper, raisins, cotton, almonds,
silk cloths and camlet cloths and resold, sometimes on behalf of other
German merchants (Hofer came from Villach) wax, mercury, amber and
Apulian and Spanish saffron50. As may be inferred from the accounts
(the assets show a balance of seven thousand ducats at the Banco Giro)
and from a series of papers deposited at the Avogaria di Comun (State
Attorney) in 1601, Hofer belonged to the group of big merchants in
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45. G. Trebbi, “La società” op. cit., p. 181. On the new registrations of the marzeri cf. R.
Mackenney, Tradesmen and Traders: The World of Guilds in Venice and Europe c. 1250
– c. 1650, (Croom Helm, London/Sydney, 1989), pp. 92-94.
46. Such as Bartolomeo Cargnoni in 1627.
47. G. Corazzol, “Varietà notarile. Scorci di vita economica e sociale” in Storia di Venezia,
vol. VI: Dal Rinascimento al Barocco op. cit., pp. 775-791.
48. U. Tucci, The psycology op. cit., p. 48.
49. D. Sella, “Crisis and transformation in the Venetian trade” in B. Pullan (ed.), Crisis
and Change in the Venetian Economy, (Methuen, London, 1968), pp. 88-105.
50. The documents regarding Hofer in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia, Notarile, Testa-
menti, notaio Pietro Partenio, b. 785, reg. 177.IV, cc. 97v-98v; Giudici di petizion, Rendi-
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Venice, where he lived for many years “trading in huge sums like all the
other merchants, living with the utmost honour without practising any
mechanical art”. His activities, which confirm Venice’s traditional role
as a trading centre, and his business success are one of the many cases
bearing witness to the fact that the Venetian market was still in good
health at the end of the sixteenth century51 and that relations with
Germany continued to thrive until the early seventeenth century52. Hofer
was, in fact, an eminent member of the German mercantile colony which
was among the largest and best integrated in the Venetian market from
the thirteenth century onwards. On Hofer’s death in 1596, his business
was handed over to his illegitimate son Ottavio and to two Germans, who
had already worked for him as “agents”, Giona Zanmaister and Giovanni
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menti di conto, b. 960/7, fasc. 39; Avogaria di Comun, Processi per nobiltà, fasc. 335/53,
Offer; Provveditori alla sanità, Necrologi, reg. 826. c. n. n., 23 novembre 1596. The
probate inventory is quoted in M. Hochmann, “Le collezioni veneziane nel Rinasci-
mento: storia e storiografia” in M. Hochmann, R. Lauber, S. Mason (eds.), Il collezion-
ismo d’arte a Venezia. Dalle origini al Cinquecento, (Marsilio, Venezia, 2008), p. 11 and
p. 36 n. 52. The Hofers (or Hoffers), councillors in the town of Villach, were raised
to the nobility by Emperor Rudolph II in 1588. E. S. Rösch Widmann, I Widmann.
Le vicende di una famiglia veneziana dal Cinquecento all’Ottocento, (Centro tedesco di
studi veneziani, Venezia, 1980), p. 4. Hofer (born in 1540) arrived in Venice, probably
in the retinue of his elder brother Cristoforo, and at least three times held the presti-
gious office of Fontego Consul (in 1584, 1590 and 1591). H. Simonsfeld, Der Fondaco
dei Tedeschi in Venedig und die deutsch-venetianischen Handelsbeziehungen, J. G.
Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, (Stuttgart, 1887), vol. I, pp. 411-412, doc. 712 and vol.
II, p. 172. A notarial deed mentions a Giovanni Hoffer, a “German merchant” in
Florence, appointed attorney for the recovery of a cargo of cotton from Alexandria
on behalf of Giorgio Pech, another German often mentioned among the Fontego resi-
dents. Archivio di stato di Venezia, Notarile, Atti, notai Carlo Bianco e Antonio
Alchieri, b.3, fasc. V, 29 maggio 1572. In 1592, Cristofor Hoffer, together with other
German merchants, attested to the origins (Augsburg) of Daniele and Giorgio Hopfer.
Ivi, notaio Pietro Partenio, reg. 10686, c. 37v, 8 febbraio 1592 a nativitate. H. Simons-
feld, Der Fondaco op. cit., vol 2, p. 172. 
51. D. Sella, “L’economia” in Storia di Venezia, vol. VI: Dal Rinascimento al Barocco op. cit.,
pp. 651-711; Idem, Crisis and Transformation op. cit., p. 88-105. 
52. D. Sella, “Crisis and Transformation” op. cit., p. 94.
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Widmann, this latter destined for a radiant future in Venice53. While the
decision to hand over the management of the company to those who were
already running it was an efficient management move, kinship ties (Widman
was Hofer’s nephew on his mother’s side) and a shared nationality (Zan-
maister) fostered the strong connections that appeared necessary in long-
distance merchant networks. The partners, that is those called to physically
control part of the capital and who carried weight in its use, were two
Venetians by charter, Simone Castellano and Giovanni dalla Nave54. Fur-
thermore, of the ten or so witnesses called to the Avogaria in 1601, who
had had numerous business dealings with Hofer over a long period of time,
eight belonged to a group of successful immigrants, who were applying for
Venetian citizenship: some members of the Tasca family (among the most
active merchants from Bergamo), Paolo Antonio Labia, Martino Ferro and
Bartolomeo Bontempelli, a luxury marzer. Giovanni dalla Nave also came
from Bergamo and was an active spice-trader, with a shop at San Bartolomeo,
near the Fondaco dei Tedeschi55. These trading contacts were partly
reinforced by family connections: Alessandro Tasca, decribing himself as
a merchant and “gentleman” from Bergamo, married a relation of Hoffer’s
second wife, the daughter of a German merchant of the Fondaco.
The importance of the Venetian market for the resident foreign
communities is referred to in a report by the Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia
(The Venetian Board of Trade) in 160756. It describes the commercial
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53. Giovanni Widmann had already worked for him for ten years; Zanmaister must have
worked for him for longer and must have been more experienced, because Hoffer gave
him a quarter of the profits and an eighth each to Widmann and Ottavio. On
Widmann, cf. E. Rösch Widmann, I Widmann, op. cit., pp. 4-5. 
54. Biblioteca del Civico Museo Correr, Venezia, mss. P. D. c4, vol. 2 c.42 and vol. 4 cc.
251-252.
55. S. Furtlehner, “Bartolomeo dalla Nave” in L. Borean, S. Mason (eds.), Il collezionismo
d’arte a Venezia. Il Seicento, (Marsilio, Venezia 2007), p. 258.
56. Archivio di stato di Venezia, Cinque savi alla mercanzia, serie II, b. 13, fasc. 229, 16
gennaio 1606 more veneto. The document is quoted in another transcription and
another collection (the series Risposte of the Cinque Savi) by M. van Gelder, Trading
Places. The Netherlandish Merchants in Early Modern Europe, (Brill, Leiden/Boston,
2009), p. 90 and n. 87.
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and financial activities of the five principal “nations” that traded on a
large scale in Venice (Florence, Genoa, Germany, Flanders, and Milan).
A year and a half later, another report mention again main foreign traders
in Venice listing people from Genoa, Lucca, Florence, Milan, Germany,
and Flanders57. It is worth noting that, between 1646 and 1718, some
57% of the patrician families came from merchant circles and, of these,
the majority came from Bergamo58. 
A Tale of Two Merchants
may we, therefore, conclude that there were no substantial differ-
ences between patrician merchants and ordinary merchants? Actually,
for legal purposes, there were no differences; however, there is no doubt
that those who sat in the government magistracies possessed some
degree of superiority59. Because of his political position, a patrician
could have access to information that was not always available to other
Venetians. In a world where information was essential for making deci-
sions and determining strategies quickly, the patrician was well placed.
Nevertheless, these prerogatives did not belong exclusively to the patri-
ciate for the economic interconnections between nobles and citizen
merchants rendered information a widely-shared asset. Although the
family partnership was an important trading institution in Venice,
companies were certainly not unheard-of. We need only to glance
through the sixteenth and seventeenth-century notarial deeds to come
across cases of companies formed by patricians, citizens and foreigners
for the most varied activities.
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57. Archivio di stato di Venezia, Cinque savi alla mercanzia,serie II, b. 13, fasc. 229, 12
settembre 1608.
58. R. Sabbadini, L’acquisto della tradizione. Tradizione aristocratica e nuova nobiltà a Venezia
(sec. XVII-XVIII),( Istituto editoriale veneto friulano, Udine, 1995), pp. 34-36.
59. G. Luzzatto, “L’attività commerciale di un patrizio veneziano del Quattrocento” in
Idem, Studi di storia economica op. cit., pp. 167-200.
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In the last quarter of the sixteenth century the Venetian mercantile
world was marked by two figures, who were in some ways emblematic:
the nobleman Giacomo Foscarini and the citizen Giacomo Ragazzoni60.
Their lives were parallel. Belonging to the same generation, since
Foscarini was born in 1523 and Ragazzoni five years later, they both
came from families connected with trade. It was not fortuitous that they
met in London, while they were serving their apprenticeship in the over-
seas warehouses, as was the custom for young men61. In London they
formed a company and, above all, a fellowship that went beyond the
limits of a mere business connection. Foscarini retired from full-time
trading in the 1560s, attracted by a life in politics that was to prove
extremely eventful and highly successful; his brother, Girolamo, who
was in England, and his sons Giambattista and Foscarina took his place62.
Ragazzoni returned to Venice in 1558, too, leaving his brother Placido
to run the business in England but, unlike his noble partner, he
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60. Giuseppe Gallucci, La vita del Carissimo Signor Iacomo Ragazzoni conte di S. Odorico,
(Appresso Giorgio Rizzardo, Venice, 1610); Bartolomeo Ridolfi Sforza, Vita di
Giacopo Foscarini, (Pinelli, Venice, 1745). The Ragazzoni family did not belong to
the Venetian aristocracy, as it seems from P. Ioly Zorattini (ed.), Processi del S. Uffizio
di Venezia contro ebrei e giudaizzanti, VII, (Olschki, Firenze, 1980), p. 49n.
61. On Foscarini cf. R. Zago’s fine entry in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Istituto della
Enciclopedia Italiana, Rome. Ragazzoni went to England in 1542. The presence of
Giacomo Ragazzoni and his brother Placido is mentioned in the Calendar of State
Papers, Venice, VI, (s.n.), (London, 1877), doc. 124-125 (12 August and 17 December
1552), 1256 (31st July 1558); ivi, Foreign, Elizabeth, IV, London, 1866, doc. 148 (26
April, 1561), 542 (27 September 1561) with interesting political implications. Note
that Alfonso Ulloa, Dialogo del vero honore militare, (Sessa, Venezia, 1569), dedicating
the work to Giacomo Ragazzoni, stresses his familiarity with the English Court. For
Giacomo’s date of birth, cf. Archivio di stato di Venezia, Misc. Codici, I, Storia veneta,
IV, c. 1617. A Ragazzoni family tree is to be found in the Biblioteca del Civico Museo
Correr, Venezia, Ms. Cicogna, 3427, fasc. Famiglia Ragazzoni.
62. A mention of Giacomo Foscarini’s direct participation with the brothers Placido,
Giacomo and Alvise is found again in 1587, when Placido Ragazzoni drew up his
will: Archivio di stato di Venezia, Notarile, Testamenti, notaio Carlo Ziliol, 1265, fasc.
XIV (20 aprile 1587).
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continued to spend his whole life in business63. Although it is difficult to
identify Ragazzoni’s core business, it seems that trade with England
remained one of his main interests, but there were also industrial invest-
ments (sugar, timber and the building trade), tax-farming contracts, loans
(mortgages and on exchange fairs) and, of course, investments in land64.
The crowning achievement of Ragazzoni’s social and economic success
was the title of Count of Sant’Odorico, a locality near Sacile, with the
attached title of nobile castellano of the Patria del Friuli. This was a success
but, perhaps, did not adequately compensate for his failure to enter the
Venetian patriciate, as it had seemed possible during the Cyprus war65.
Despite the loss of three large ships, fortune smiled on Ragazzoni, who
was able to give a fitting dowry (spending some 130,000 ducats, including
wedding expenses) to his seven daughters and to marry them to seven
noblemen. The Ragazzoni women thus became the main means of tying
the family’s fates to those of the patriciate. Moreover, Giacomo did not
abandon his daughters to their destiny, even after they had married into
the nobility. As long as he lived, the old merchant looked after his daugh-
ters’ affairs and supported them, when they were widowed66. 
Foscarini died in 1603 and Ragazzoni seven years later, in 1610. When
they dictated their last will and testament, they both remembered their
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63. Giacomo’s adventures are narrated in a sort of autobiography in his will in Archivio
di stato di Venezia, Notarile, Testamenti, notaio Pietro Partenio, 784 (7 maggio 1609)
on which Gallucci probably based his La vita, op. cit.
64. References to numerous activities of Ragazzoni are in Archivio di stato di Venezia,
Notarile, Atti, notaio Pier Giovanni Mamoli, 8279, 8281, 8284, 8291-92, 8295 for the
1560s and the 1570s; ibid., notaio Zuan Andrea Catti, 3365-69 for the 1590s. For his
real estate assets, Archivio di stato di Venezia, Dieci savi alle decime in Rialto, 162
(n.141), 180 (n. 2805), 280 (n.2802 for 1594). 
65. This is referred by the Florentine ambassador in Venice (Archivio di Stato, Florence,
Mediceo del principato, filza 3090, c. 56v, 12 aprile 1572). Cf. L. Pezzolo, L’oro dello
Stato. Società, finanza e fisco nella Repubblica veneta del secondo ’500, (Il cardo, Venezia,
1990), pp. 186-187.
66. Cf. for example, Archivio di stato di Venezia, Archivio privato Contarini in Archivio
privato Marcello Grimani Giustinian, 5.
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long friendship and the business they had in common: in his will of
1595, Foscarini took care to leave to Ragazzoni a precious small table as
a memento. Ragazzoni was left alone to reminisce on the far-off years
in England, when his prestigious partner and friend had carried on very
important trading business67. Their destinies had bound them to a
common environment, the merchant world, and had later seemed to
diverge but, in fact, they followed parallel paths. In both cases trading
activities became less important – at different times and in different ways
– to make way for real estate and financial investments. Foscarini seems
to epitomize the typical patrician who, abandoned trade for politics and
lived off unearned income. It is worth noting, however, that the presti-
gious politician was concerned with leaving the trading business to his
own sons and that, even at the height of his political worries, he
frequented Venetian merchant circles.
The Constraints of a Myth
the aforementioned report about the foreign exchange situation in
1607 reiterated the importance of the old shipping routes to the Levant,
freed from the danger of pirates, in the prosperity of the Republic’s trade
and industry. 68 The report referred to a situation that was not so distant
in time, but it is surprising to find that, in the seventeenth century and
even in the eighteenth century, maritime trade was still seen as a strategic
solution for the Republic’s survival69, when the fortunes of Venetian
commerce seemed to have waned and international markets were domi-
nated by the great powers. And yet the statements of the patrician magis-
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67. Archivio di stato di Venezia, Notarile, Testamenti, notaio Nicolò Doglioni, 344, n. 370
(marzo 1959); ibid., n. 784 (7 maggio 1609).
68. Archivio di stato di Venezia, Cinque savi alla mercanzia, serie II, b. 13, fasc. 229, 16
gennaio 1606 more veneto.
69. E. Leso, “Nota introduttiva” in La letteratura italiana. Storia e testi, vol. 44: Dal Muratori
al Cesarotti, t.V, Politici ed economisti del primo Settecento, ed. by R. Ajello et al.,
Raffaello Ricciardi, (Milano/Napoli, 1978), p. 189. 
J_0212_Cecchini_pp.87-114  17/09/12  10.47  Pagina 107
trates, called upon to express their opinion, should not be interpreted as
a mere form of rhetoric, nostalgically evoking the glories of the past. Even
after radical changes in Mediterranean trade and the Republic’s undeniable
weakness, compared with tougher, more efficient competitors, Venetians
continued to believe that their city still found vigour and life-giving energy
in trade. The protagonists of trade had changed: the patrician merchants
had gradually abandoned personal involvement in overseas warehouses
and in galleys in favour of interests in real estate and finance. Of course,
nobles involved in insurance and in the lucrative trading of timber, grain
and exotic products were still to be found, but there is no doubt that the
economic profile of the Venetian ruling class had changed radically. We
must, therefore, ask ourselves whether this change had any consequences
for the government’s attitude to trade: whether, in the final analysis, when
the close and centuries-old connection between trading interests and
political institutions waned, a significant indifference to the problems of
international trade emerged. At first sight, the answer is no. The govern-
ment was well aware that, in order to maintain Venice’s crucial role in the
market, it had to satisfy the merchants’ requests, even though most of
them had nothing to do with the halls of power. It is not surprising, then,
that the Flemish community, cleverly claiming to be the essential link
between Venice, the trading centres of Northern Europe and the new
Asian routes, were listened to kindly by the magistrates of St. Mark’s70.
In fact, every variation in the flow of trade affected a crucial point of
government finance and customs duties. Unsurprisingly, every petition
on the part of foreign merchants, whether they acted in a group (as a
“nation”) or individually, usually requested a reduction in customs duty
and the exemptions enjoyed by de intus et de extra citizens. In the second
half of the sixteenth century, customs duties still constituted the prime
source of Venetian mainland revenue, and was an indispensable item in
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70. M. van Gelder, “How to influence Venetian economic policy: collective petitions of
the Netherlandish merchant community in the early seventeenth century” in Mediter-
ranean Historical Review, 24, n. 1, 2009, pp. 29-47.
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the city’s budget71. Until the end of the seventeenth century the main
customs were the entrata da Terra e da Mar – according to the origin of
the goods entering the city; the Fontego dei tedeschi (tax reductions for
the Germans were recognized because of the importance of their trade,
and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries many Flemish merchants
joined the Germans); the Transito for goods in transit; and the Insida
for goods produced in Venice and destined for export. In each of these,
the contribution of foreign merchants was indispensable on account of
the city’s vocation as an international trade hub. Venice had thus
succeeded in saddling foreign merchants – and their customers – with
part of the tax burden; however, while it is true that the fall in customs
revenue at the dawn of the seventeenth century led to increased taxation
for the Venetians72, the “indulgent” policy towards the foreign
merchants, who continued to settle in the city, and the constant battle
against smuggling that was carried out at the same time, reflect the
government’s attempt to save at least the fiscal “essence” of the tradi-
tional source of Venetian wealth.
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